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Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical model for the formation of subjective beliefs
on individual survival expectations. Data from the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) indicate that, on average, young respondents underestimate their true sur-
vival probability whereas old respondents overestimate their survival probability.
Such subjective beliefs violate the rational expectations paradigm and are also
not in line with the predictions of the rational Bayesian learning paradigm. We
therefore introduce a model of Bayesian learning which combines rational learn-
ing with the possibility that the interpretation of new information is prone to
psychological attitudes. We estimate the parameters of our theoretical model by
pooling the HRS data. Despite a parsimonious parametrization we find that our
model results in a remarkable fit to the average subjective beliefs expressed in
the data.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic economic models are based on the forward looking behavior of economic
agents. In the context of life-cycle models, an individual’s consumption and savings
decision depends on her subjective beliefs about future interest rates, wage rates and
the likelihood of dying. According to these models, individuals have beliefs about such
variables and use these beliefs to make decisions today. Until recently common practice
in such studies was to assume rational expectations implying that the individuals’ be-
liefs are given as objective probability distributions. The use of objective distributions
is by now put into question by numerous researchers who suggest to directly measure
subjective expectations and to evaluate the consequences of deviations of subjective
expectations from their objective counterparts. Manski (2004) provides an overview
on this literature.
In this paper we develop a model of survival belief formation that differs from the
existing literature on subjective expectations in two respects. First, we allow for the
possibility that people report subjective beliefs that express ambiguity attitudes. We
will formally describe such ambiguous beliefs as non-additive probability measures, i.e.,
capacities, which arise in Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) theory (Schmeidler 1989;
Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993) in order to accommodate Ellsberg paradoxes (Ellsberg
1961). Second, as a generalization of the standard assumption of rational Bayesian
learning, we consider a model of psychologically biased Bayesian learning. For the
representative agent of our model an initial bias between her subjective beliefs and
objective probabilities does not necessarily vanish in the long run. Several studies in the
psychological literature show that real-life agents systematically violate the assumption
of rational Bayesian learning in that their learning behavior is prone to effects such
as “myside bias” or “irrational belief persistence” cf. Baron (2007, Ch. 9) and the
references cited there. The stylized facts in our data on subjective survival beliefs may
reflect such attitudes and our formal approach attempts to accommodate these.
As our point of departure we compare subjective survival beliefs, based on the data
of the last three waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), with objective
survival rates. In our data on subjective beliefs we have information about individuals’
expectations to live from the age at interview j up to some target age m. Age at
interview j and target age m are assigned according to the pattern in table 1. Our
objective survival rates are based on cohort life tables for the U.S. population.1 We also
address the concern of selectivity of our HRS sample and provide empirical evidence
that population wide mortality rates can indeed be used as the relevant objective data
in our context.
Figure 1 summarizes the information in our data by displaying the average sub-
jective beliefs on survival of HRS respondents against the age at interview and the
1To construct these cohort life tables we predict population wide survival probabilities taken from
the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Human Mortality Database (HMD) beyond the
data horizon of 2004, the year of the last wave of the HRS. We base the extrapolation on estimates
stemming from a Lee-Carter procedure (Lee and Carter 1992).
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Table 1: Interview and Target Age
Age at Interview j Target Age m
≤69 80
70-74 85
75-79 90
80-84 95
85-89 100
Source: RAND HRS Data Documentation, Version F (October 2006).
respective objective data for men in panel (a) and women in panel (b). The different
line segments are due to changes in target ages, cf. table 1. Two stylized facts emerge
for either gender from the data. First, the subjective beliefs on survival are downward
biased at younger ages. Second, the subjective beliefs on survival are upward biased
at older ages whereby the upward bias increases with age. These stylized facts clearly
indicate a systematic violation of the rational expectations paradigm of economic the-
ory by which there should be no difference between subjective beliefs and objective
survival rates.2
In addition to the violation of the rational expectations paradigm, the age-dependent
bias in the HRS data about life expectancy also suggests a violation of the rational
Bayesian learning paradigm. Models of subjective belief formation based on rational
Bayesian learning generate posterior beliefs that are closer to the true, i.e., objective,
distribution the more experienced the agent becomes. If an agent gains more experience
by getting older, rational Bayesian learning requires the agent to learn with increasing
age the true probabilities (cf. Viscusi (1990, 1991) and subsection 2.2 of this paper
for a more detailed discussion). Under the assumption of rational Bayesian learning
any gap between subjective beliefs and objective survival probabilities should therefore
decrease with increasing age, implying that the average beliefs of people are closer to
the true probabilities when they get older. For younger respondents (≤ 69) the data in
figure 1 is compatible with the convergence behavior as predicted by rational Bayesian
learning.3 However, upon inspection of the age-belief pattern of elderly respondents of
age 75 and older in figure 1, the picture changes. In figure 2 we zoom in from figure
1 the average beliefs of male respondents between interview ages 80 to 89 to survive
2Our findings thus confirm similar results belonging to a line of research initiated by Hammer-
mesh (1985). In two different data samples from surveys, Hammermesh (1985) found that people do
incorporate improvements of life-expectancy into their beliefs about personal longevity and that the
subjective survival curves are somewhat flatter than the objective data. Similar differences between
subjective beliefs and the objective data have been reported for the HRS by Hurd and Kathleen (1995)
and Gan, Hurd, and McFadden (2003) and others and, more recently, for the Survey of Health, Ageing
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) data (Hurd, Rohwedder, and Winter 2005).
3For women we do not observe such a clear convergent pattern even for this age group.
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Figure 1: Subjective and objective survival probabilities
(a) Men
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Source: Own calculations based on HRS, HMD and SSA data.
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until 95, respectively until 100, against their objective counterparts in panel (a). To
illustrate learning behavior in this age group we estimated simple linear trends for
both the subjective and the objective data and display the differences in these trends
in panel (b) of the same figure. This graphs indicates divergence with increasing age.
This divergent pattern is stronger for the higher interview/target age group. Thus,
contrary to the predictions of the rational Bayesian learning model the average bias
between subjective beliefs and objective probabilities increases rather than decreases
with more experience whereby this effect appears to be stronger for higher target ages.
The patterns shown in figure 2 illustrate a violation of the rational Bayesian learning
paradigm within target age groups. Furthermore, notice that, in order to explain the
data across target age groups, the rational Bayesian learning hypothesis would require
highly implausible prior beliefs. For example, the overestimation of the subjective
belief of an 80 year old agent to live until 95 by 17.28 percentage points for men
(8.54 percentage points for women), cf. figure 1, can only be explained with rational
Baysian learning if the same agent expressed a prior belief with a much higher degree
of overestimation about her survival at the age of 50. However, at the age of 50, we
actually observe an average underestimation of the survival belief by −13.70 percentage
points for men (−15.07 percentage points for women).
Our model of Bayesian learning with psychological bias captures the stylized facts
of figure 1 in a very parsimonious way whereby it also offers a plausible explanation
why young people are too pessimistic whereas elderly people are too optimistic about
their survival expectations. While rational Bayesian learning may be appropriate in
situations in which individuals are emotionally detached from any new information
arriving (think, e.g., about tossing a coin in order to learning the odds whether it ends
up heads or tails), this may not be the case if new information has a strong personal
impact on the individual. In such situations the individual’s learning process may
be prone to emotions such as hope or despair. This holds in particular true when an
individual learns new information about its life expectancy thereby facing the prospect
of its own death.4 We feel that the most plausible explanation for the overly optimistic
life expectations of elderly people is an optimistic “myside bias” in their interpretation
of any new information which assists them to better ignore the increasingly relevant
prospect of death. In contrast, younger people are less biased because the prospect
of their death is less relevant yet and they may even underestimate increases in life
expectancy due to medical progress.
Our theoretical framework provides a parsimonious specification of the representa-
tive agent’s age-belief pattern with four parameters, reflecting, first, an initial bias in
subjective survival probabilities, second, the strength of the rational Bayesian learning
process, third, ambiguity aversion, and, fourth, the degree of optimism, respectively
pessimism, by which the agent resolves her ambiguity. We then estimate the parameters
4Along this line, Kastenbaum (2000) summarizes the insights of psychological research on the
reflection about personal death as follows: “There are divergent theories and somewhat discordant
findings, but general agreement that most of us prefer to minimize even our cognitive encounters with
death.”
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Figure 2: Survival probabilities at age 80 and older for men
(a) Objective and subjective probabilities
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Source: Own calculations based on HRS, HMD and SSA data.
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of our theoretical model by pooling the HRS data. Despite the low parametrization,
our model results in a decent fit to the average data on subjective beliefs. We also find
that the model’s performance is somewhat better for female than for male respondents.
Our approach is related to a literature initiated by Viscusi (1985) who analyzes
changes in risk perceptions by a simple model of rational Bayesian learning. In the
context of the HRS data on subjective survival probabilities this approach has been
used by Smith, Taylor, and Sloan (2001) and Smith, Taylor, Sloan, Johnson, and
Desvouges (2001) who test how new information about health shocks between two in-
terview waves affects updating of individuals in the HRS.5 In contrast to this literature
our approach is more general in that it allows for the possibility that individuals are
not rational Bayesian learners. Moreover, while we do not investigate how certain id-
iosyncratic shocks, e.g., general versus smoking related health shocks or parental death,
affect updating of individuals and how updating differs across subgroups of individuals,
the strength of our parsimonious setup is that it can be directly mapped into calibrated
micro- or macroeconomic life-cycle models with representative agents.
The remainder of our analysis is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our
decision theoretic framework resulting in a parsimonious model of subjective life ex-
pectancy. In section 3 we describe the data we use for estimation of the parameters
of our model. We then present the main results of our empirical analysis in section 4.
Finally, section 5 concludes. A separate appendix contains proofs and some additional
results on sensitivity analysis.
2 A Parsimonious Model of Subjective Life Expectancy
2.1 Ambiguous Beliefs
We assume that individuals exhibit ambiguity attitudes in the sense of Schmeidler
(1989) and who may thus, for example, commit paradoxes of the Ellsberg type (Ellsberg
1961). Following Schmeidler (1989), such individuals could be described as Choquet
Expected Utility (CEU) decision makers, that is, they maximize expected utility with
respect to non-additive beliefs.6 Our own approach focuses on non-additive beliefs that
are defined as neo-additive capacities in the sense of Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and
Grant (2007).
5Under the assumption that all individuals are rational Bayesian learners, Smith, Taylor, Sloan,
Johnson, and Desvouges (2001) show that a representative smoker updates her beliefs in a different way
than a representative non-smokers when she learns about “general” compared to “smoking-related”
health shocks.
6Properties of non-additive beliefs are used in the literature for formal definitions of, e.g., ambiguity
and uncertainty attitudes (Schmeidler 1989; Epstein 1999; Ghirardato and Marinacci 2002), pessimism
and optimism (Eichberger and Kelsey 1999; Wakker 2001; Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant 2007),
as well as sensitivity to changes in likelihood (Wakker 2004).
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Definition 1. For a given measurable space (S,Σ) the neo-additive capacity, ν, is
defined, for some δ, λ ∈ [0, 1] by
ν (E) = δ · (λ · ωo (E) + (1− λ) · ωp (E)) + (1− δ) · p˜i (E) (1)
for all E ∈ Σ such that p˜i is some additive probability measure and we have for the
non-additive capacities ωo
ωo (E) = 1 if E 6= ∅
ωo (E) = 0 if E = ∅
and ωp respectively
ωp (E) = 0 if E 6= S
ωp (E) = 1 if E = S.
Recall that a Savage-act f is a mapping from the state space S into the set of
consequences X. For a finite state space the Choquet expected utility of Savage act f
with respect to a neo-additive capacity ν is given as
CEU (f, ν) = δ ·
(
λ ·max
s∈S
u (f (s)) + (1− λ) ·min
s∈S
u (f (s))
)
(2)
+ (1− δ) ·
∑
s∈S
p˜i (s) · u (f (s)) ,
where u : X → R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Neo-additive
capacities can be interpreted as non-additive beliefs that represent deviations from
additive beliefs such that a parameter δ (degree of ambiguity) measures the lack of
confidence the decision maker has in some subjective additive probability distribution
p˜i. Obviously, if there is no ambiguity, i.e., δ = 0, equation (2) reduces to the standard
subjective expected utility representation of Savage (1954). In case there is some
ambiguity, however, the second parameter λ measures how much weight the decision
maker puts on the best possible outcome of alternative f when resolving her ambiguity.
Conversely, (1− λ) is the weight she puts on the worst possible outcome of f . As a
consequence, we interprete λ as an “optimism under ambiguity” parameter.
In the context of survival expectations, we are interested in the agent’s belief to
be alive at some target age m. Let us misuse notation and also write m for the event
that the agent is still alive at age m. Under the assumption that there is always the
possibility to reach age m, the event m cannot be the null event, implying ωo (m) = 1.
On the other hand, we also stipulate that there is always the possibility to die before
reaching age m so that m cannot be the universal event either, implying ωp (m) = 0.
As a consequence, the agent’s belief to survive until age m in (1) simplifies to
ν (m) = δ · λ+ (1− δ) · p˜i (m) . (3)
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According to our interpretation the additive probability distribution p˜i in (3) is
the representative agent’s estimator of her survival probability. Under the rational
expectations paradigm this estimator p˜i must, first, coincide with the “true” probability
distribution and, second, the agent must not be ambiguous about her subjective belief,
i.e., δ = 0. However, we do not only assume that the representative agent is ambiguous
about her subjective belief, δ 6= 0, but also that p˜i may be a biased estimator of the
“true” probability distribution, denoted by pi.
2.2 Bayesian Learning with Psychological Bias
In this subsection we develop our concept of Bayesian learning with a psychological
bias. In our model the representative agent receives new information about her life-
expectancy when she gets older. Since we consider ambiguous beliefs, the resulting
updating process deviates from rational Bayesian learning in that the strength of am-
biguity attitudes may increase over time. We proceed in four steps.
Recall, in a first step, Viscusi (1985)’s model of rational Bayesian learning7 and
consider some prior Beta distribution over the parameter pi of a Binomial-distribution
such that pi is the “true” probability that a representative agent survives to age m. If
the subjective prior about pi, denoted p˜i, is the expected value of this prior Beta distri-
bution, we have p˜i (m) = α
α+β
for given parameters α and β. Let I denote information
that is equivalent to a statistical experiment in which m has occurred k-times in n
independent trials and let p˜iI (m) denote the agent’s posterior about pi given the new
information I.8 Rational Bayesian updating then results in a posterior Beta distribu-
tion about pi with expected value α+k
α+β+n
implying for the posterior belief
p˜iI (m) = γn · p˜i (m) + (1− γn) · µn (m) (4)
such that
γn =
α + β
α + β + n
,
where µn (m) is the sample mean
k
n
.9
Rather than modelling the unconditional belief of surviving to some target age our
focus is on the agent’s conditional survival beliefs. Under the assumption of rational
Bayesian learning we therefore look, in a second step, at the belief p˜iI (m | j) that
the agent will be alive at age m provided that she is alive at age j and has received
7This specific model of rational Bayesian learning has become very popular in the empirical litera-
ture on risk perception (Viscusi 1991; Smith, Taylor, and Sloan 2001; Smith, Taylor, Sloan, Johnson,
and Desvouges 2001).
8As a notational convention we use subscript notation when we condition on the information
available to the agent. The reason for this notational convention will become clear once we move from
unconditional to conditional expectations.
9Tonks (1983) introduces a similar model of rational Bayesian learning in which the agent has a
normally distributed prior over the mean of some normal distribution.
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information I. Since j ≤ m, we obtain by (4) for this conditional belief
p˜iI (m | j) = p˜iI (m)
p˜iI (j)
= γ∗n · p˜i (m | j) + (1− γ∗n) ·
µn (m)
µn (j)
with
γ∗n =
p˜i (j) · (α+ β)
p˜i (j) · (α + β) + n · µn (j) .
In a next step, we have to take a stand on how an agent updates her ambiguous
beliefs. Several different Bayesian update rules are perceivable for the non-additive
beliefs of CEU decision-makers (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993; Pires 2002; Eichberger,
Grant, and Kelsey 2006; Siniscalchi 2001; Siniscalchi 2006). In this paper we consider
the so-called generalized Bayesian update rule. As shown in appendix A.1 this results
in the posterior conditional survival belief
νI (m | j) = δI · λ+ (1− δI) · p˜iI (m | j)
where
δI =
δ
δ + (1− δ) · p˜i (j ∩ I) .
In a final step, we link the information received by the agent to her age. We suppose
that an agent of age h receives information Ih which is equivalent to information gained
from a statistical experiment with n (h) trials whereby the experience function n (h)
satisfies n (0) = 0 and n (h)→∞ if h→∞. That is, our approach associates a higher
age with greater experience.
Proposition 1. Under the assumption of Bayesian learning with psychological bias,
the posterior belief of an agent of age h to survive until age m conditional on being
alive at age j is given as
νIh (m | j) = δIh · λ+ (1− δIh) · p˜iIh (m | j)
such that
δIh =
δ
δ + (1− δ) · p˜i (j ∩ Ih)
and
p˜iIh (m | j) = γ∗n(h) · p˜i (m | j) +
(
1− γ∗n(h)
) · µn(h) (m)
µn(h) (j)
with
γ∗n(h) =
p˜i (j) · (α + β)
p˜i (j) · (α+ β) + n (h) · µn(h) (j) .
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Observe that µn (m) → pi (m) and µn (j) → pi (j) in probability if the number of
trials approaches infinity. Since γ∗n → 0 if n(h)→∞, the posterior p˜iIh (m | j) converges
in probability to the true survival rate pi (m | j) if the agent observes infinitely many
trials. Thus, in the case without ambiguity, i.e., for δ = 0, our model reduces to
the standard model of rational Bayesian learning. Furthermore, under the plausible
assumption that the agent does not expect to live forever, that is for p˜i (j) → 0 with
increasing age j, we observe the following:
Observation 1. Under Bayesian learning with psychological bias the conditional pos-
terior belief νIh (m | j) converges in probability with increasing age to the initial degree
of optimism under ambiguity, λ, if δ > 0, and to the objective survival probability
pi (m | j) if δ = 0.
Thus, whenever there is some ambiguity involved, i.e., δ > 0, Bayesian learning with
psychological bias implies that the impact of the additive part on the overall belief will
decrease with increasing age. In the context of survival expectations this allows us to
formally express the idea that individuals minimize their “cognitive encounters with
death” (Kastenbaum 2000) and suppress the notion of death the more relevant the risk
of dying becomes, i.e., the older they are.
2.3 A Parsimonious Model
We now develop a simplified version of our model of Bayesian learning with psycho-
logical bias that we bring to the data on survival beliefs in section 4. To this end,
we make the following assumptions: First, we restrict ourselves to a linear experience
function, i.e., n (h) = ψ · h with ψ > 0. Second, we assume that the representative
agent of age h receives information Ih such that h ⊆ Ih. Under this assumption, the
information at a specific age is deterministic rather than random, which can be jus-
tified by the fact that the representative agent’s information represents the average
information of a large population. Third, we suppose that the representative agent
observes at every age sample means that actually coincide with the objective survival
rates, i.e., µn(h) (m) = pi (m) and µn(h) (j) = pi (j) for all h. Again, this assumption is
appealing for large populations. Fourth, our data is organized such that interview age
j and information h are identical, hence n(h) = n(j) = ψ · j and so forth. Finally, at
age j = 0, we initialize p˜i0 (r + 1 | r) for all r = 0, ...,m− 1 as
0 ≤ p˜i0 (r + 1 | r) = φpi (r + 1 | r) ≤ 1. (5)
The unconditional belief to survive until interview age j formed at age 0, p˜i(j), is
accordingly given by
p˜i(j) = φjpi (j) =
j−1∏
r=0
φpi(r + 1 | r), (6)
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and we also have that
p˜i (m | j) = φm−j · pi (m | j) . (7)
Using these assumptions in proposition 1 we can summarize our parameterized
model of subjective life expectancy as follows:
Proposition 2. The posterior belief of an agent of age j to survive until age m con-
ditional on being alive at age j is
νj (m | j) = δj · λ+ (1− δj) · p˜ij (m | j)
such that
δj =
δ
δ + (1− δ) · φjpi (j)
and
p˜ij (m | j) =
(
φm + ξj
φj + ξj
)
· pi (m | j)
where
ξ =
ψ
α+ β
.
Consequently, our simplified version of Bayesian learning with psychological bias
results in a parsimonious specification of the representative agent’s age-belief pattern
with a vector of four parameters, Ψ = [φ, ξ, δ, λ], only. These parameters reflect (i) an
initial bias in the additive estimator reflecting overestimation, i.e., φ > 1, or underesti-
mation, i.e., φ < 1, (ii) the strength of the rational Bayesian learning process (ξ), (iii)
a measure for ambiguity (δ), and (iv) the degree of optimism, respectively pessimism,
by which the agent resolves her ambiguity (λ).
Remark. If there is no ambiguity in the agent’s beliefs, i.e., δ = 0, our model
reduces to a version of rational Bayesian learning by which the agent’s subjective
belief p˜ij (m | j) converges to the objective probability pi (m | j) when her actual age j
approaches the target age m. Depending on an initial overestimation, i.e., φ > 1, resp.
underestimation, i.e., φ < 1, the subjective beliefs thereby monotonically converge
from “above”, resp. “below”, whereby this convergence behavior is the same for all
target ages. As already discussed in the introduction, such a model of rational Bayesian
learning can obviously not accommodate the stylized facts of figure 1, showing strong
underestimation for a lower target age, e.g., m = 80, and strong overestimation for
a higher target age, e.g., m = 95. In order to accommodate these stylized facts by
rational Bayesian learning alone, an according model would require target-age specific
parameters φm such that, e.g., φ85 < 1 and φ95 > 1. Such an extension would come at
the cost of loosing parsimony without offering a straightforward interpretation of the
additional parameters. In our opinion, it is therefore highly implausible that the HRS
data may reflect rational Bayesian learning alone.
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3 The Data
According to our model three different types of data are required for the empirical anal-
ysis that follows in section 4: (i) subjective conditional beliefs to live until target age,
(ii) objective unconditional probabilities to live until interview age and (iii) predicted
objective conditional probabilities to live from age r to age r+1 for all r = j, . . . ,m−1.
We here describe our data sources and the methodologies we apply to construct these
data.
3.1 The Data on Subjective Survival Beliefs
In the HRS, respondents of waves 5 through 7 were asked in the respective interview
years τ ∈ {2000, 2002, 2004} about their probability to live from interview age j until
a certain target age m. Recall that target ages are assigned to the respondents’ age at
interview according to the pattern in table 1.
The HRS is a national representative panel survey of individuals aged 50 and older
and their spouses. In addition to respondents from eligible birth years, the survey
interviewed the spouses or partners of the respondents, regardless of age. Thus, some
(mostly female) individuals are younger than 50 and few, younger than 40. In our
application we focus on the target group of the HRS and therefore only look at indi-
viduals of age 50 and older. Some respondents of the above question were 90 years old
at the time of interview. We do not include these observations in our analysis.
Younger HRS interviewees were also asked about their probabilities to live until
age 75. Some of these respondents have given inconsistent answers at certain points
of time as their self-reported probabilities to live until 75 are lower than the self-
reported probabilities to live until 80 or 85. We excluded these cases of evidently
inconsistent answering patterns. Furthermore, in some cases, individuals reported the
same probability to live until age 75 as to live until age 80 or 85. As this answering
pattern may be due to pure rounding and is not strictly inconsistent with our theoretical
model, we keep these observations in the sample.
This selection by age and consistency of answering patterns leaves us with a total
sample size of 44671 observations out of which 18341 are male and 26330 are female
respondents. We refer to this sample as our “full sample” below.
An apparently more serious problem than such inconsistencies is the existence of
“focal point answers” at self-reported survival probabilities of 0, 50, and 100 percent
(Hurd and Kathleen 1995; Gan, Hurd, and McFadden 2003). One interpretation for
individuals indicating probabilities of 0 or 100 percent is that they have not fully
understood the question.10 Thus, focal point answers could be regarded as implausible
estimates of subjective probabilities. However, as discussed by Smith, Taylor, Sloan,
Johnson, and Desvouges (2001) and Khwaja, Sloan, and Chung (2006), these focal
10An alternative interpretation is that focal point answers reflect ambiguity, cf. Hill, Perry, and
Willis (2004).
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point answers at 0% and 100% still have information content regarding the correct
subjective belief because smokers provide the answer 0% more frequently than non-
smokers. The target age-group specific answer pattern in our data displayed in figure 3
also illustrates that focal point answers have information content for the true subjective
belief because the frequency of focal point answers at 0% increases with target age
whereas the frequency of focal point answers at 100% decreases with target age. The
overall pattern is the same for male and female respondents. Focal point answers at 50%
may be due to round-off (Bo¨rsch-Supan 1998) or may reflect that respondents simply
do not know much about their individual survival probability (Hurd, Rohwedder, and
Winter 2005).
One approach to deal with these problems followed in the literature is to formally
correct for focal point answers. Along this line, Gan, Hurd, and McFadden (2003)
suggest a Bayesian procedure that reduces the distance between subjective survival
curves and observed survival.11 In our context, this approach is obviously meaning-
less because our aim is to explain the difference between subjective beliefs and the
objective data. The alternative, followed by Smith, Taylor, and Sloan (2001), Smith,
Taylor, Sloan, Johnson, and Desvouges (2001) and Khwaja, Sloan, and Chung (2006),
is to acknowledge the information content of focal point answers and to examine the
sensitivity of results with respect to these observations. We follow this latter approach.
In our model, focal point answers induce two sorts of biases. On the one hand,
focal point answers at 0% and 100% bias the degree of pessimism observed at young
ages and the degree of optimism observed at older ages, compare figure 1, downward
and thereby towards the objective data. This is so because the focal point answer at
100% is primarily given by younger respondents whereas the focal point answer at 0%
is primarily given by older respondents, compare figure 3. On the other hand, focal
point answers at 50% induce opposite biases towards pessimism at younger ages and
towards optimism at older ages. This is so because the objective survival probabilities
of younger respondents are above 50% whereas those of older respondents are below
50%. Consequently, the first form of bias favors our interpretation of the data whereas
the second form works against it.
Below, we first present results without any additional corrections to our data (our
full sample) and then examine the sensitivity of our results using a sample in which
all observations with focal point answers are excluded, cf. figure 4. This correction
by focal point answers leaves us with a sample size of 24225 observations (10188 male
and 14037 female respondents) out of the aforementioned 44671 observations, that is,
roughly 46% of interviewees have given focal point answers at either 0%, 50% or 100%,
respectively.
11Other researchers, such as Bloom, Canning, Moore, and Song (2006), correct for focal point
answers by instrumental variables techniques.
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Figure 3: Answer pattern
(a) Men
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(b) Women
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Source: Own calculations based on HRS data.
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Figure 4: Answer pattern (excluding focal point answers)
(a) Men
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(b) Women
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3.2 Objective survival probabilities to live until interview age
According to proposition 2, δj is a function of the initial degree of ambiguity, δ, and
the subjective probability p˜i(j) to survive until interview age j. By our assumption
in equation (6), the latter is a function of the true objective probability to reach age
j, pi(j). We calculate pi(j) from cohort life tables taken from the Human Mortality
Database (HMD) and the Social Security Administration (SSA).
3.3 Predicted objective survival probabilities
According to proposition 2, ν(m | j) is a weighted average of the degree of optimism
λ, and the subjective conditional probability to live from interview age j to target age
m, p˜i(m | j). By equation (6), the latter is a function of the true objective conditional
probabilities to reach age r+ 1 conditional on age r in the future for r = j, . . . ,m− 1.
To calculate the predicted values pi (r + 1 | r) we predict future survival rates in the
population. Our estimates are based on data for age-specific survival rates for the years
1900 to 2004 taken from the HMD and the SSA. Since projections from official sources
tend to underestimate future increases in survival probabilities, we do not use SSA
cohort life tables but rather base the prediction of future survival rates on a Lee-Carter
(Lee and Carter 1992) procedure. The idea of our approach is that the agents in our
model base their predictions of their respective objective survival probabilities on past
data but it is unobserved to the econometrician which point estimates they use. For
this reason we account for the uncertainty of the objective data in the estimation. As
an additional advantage, our procedure assigns the objective information on survival
rates in correspondence with the HRS interview years, see below. As a sensitivity
analysis, we also report estimation results in appendix A.3 which are directly based on
the SSA cohort file tables.
The Lee-Carter procedure allows us to describe and to project the development of
age-specific mortality rates over time within a parsimonious framework. Basically, the
model splits mortality rates into age-specific components that are constant over time
and a time varying survival index capturing the development of mortality. Then, one
can extrapolate the time series of the mortality index by means of a suitable time series
model. Future age-specific mortality rates can be recovered by linking the projected
mortality index to the age-specific components.
To describe the methodology, we now introduce a time index t. Following Lee and
Carter (1992) we decompose the average objective age-specific survival probability in
period t as
log(pit (r + 1 | r)) = ar + brdt (8)
where ar and br are the age-specific constants and where dt is the time specific factor.
We opt for a parsimonious representation of the time series process of dt and assume
that dt follows a unit root process with drift
dt = θ + dt−1 + ²t. (9)
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where ² ∼ N (0, σ2² ).
We assign objective survival probabilities to each respondent in our HRS panel in
each wave τ ∈ {2000, 2002, 2004} as follows. We estimate for each wave τ , sex specific
values of aˆj, bˆj, θˆ, σˆ² and calculate predicted values of pˆit (r + 1 | r) using data only
until period τ . We then proceed to the next wave and update the objective information
also using the data for the two years in between periods τ and τ+2. Our predictions of
future objective survival probabilities, pˆit (r + 1 | r), are calculated by iterating forward
on
dˆt = θˆ + dˆt−1 (10)
and
pˆit (r + 1 | r) = exp
(
aˆr + bˆrkˆt
)
. (11)
While we ignore uncertainty of our estimates of the age-vectors ar and br, we
account for uncertainty of the objective data by calculating standard deviations and
confidence intervals of θˆ by bootstrapping. Table 4 in appendix A.2 contains the
relevant information on the sex and wave specific point estimates of θˆ and the respective
standard deviations.
Figure 5 shows data on, and predicted values for, the remaining life expectancy at
age 65 for wave 2002. The dashed lines are the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
The new information on objective survival probabilities between waves only leads to
small changes in these predictions. Results for other years are therefore not shown.
Furthermore, life expectancy at birth and the remaining life-expectancies at other ages
display similar trends whereby the trend is increasing with age.
3.4 Selectivity
One criticism raised against using population averages as the relevant objective data
is that our HRS sample may be prone to selectivity. Reasons for such selection biases
are either that households have moved to nursing homes and are not followed by HRS
interviewers or that sick people are reachable but may not be able to answer the
questionnaire.12 Such selection effects may explain (some of) the optimism we observe
at higher ages in figure 1.
To address these concerns, we compute the HRS hazard rates between waves 2000
and 2002 and between waves 2002 and 2004, respectively, and compare them to the
biannual mortality rates in the population for the respective years. In figure 6 we
display the resulting hazard rates for men in panel (a) and for women in panel (b)
between waves 2002 and 2004 for our full sample. The wiggles in the HRS data
(dashed lines) are a consequence of the small sample size. Evidently, the HRS hazard
rates correspond with the mortality rates in the population. The pattern is similar for
12As Mike Hurd pointed out to us, the first selection effect was particularly severe for the early
waves of the HRS and may, if at all, only play a role for the very old respondents in our sample.
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Figure 5: Predicted life expectancy at age 65 in year 2002
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Notes: Black dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals obtained from 500 bootstrap iterations.
Source: Own calculations based on HMD and SSA data.
the hazard rates between waves 2000 and 2002 (and also for our sample corrected by
focal point answers) and therefore not shown. For ages above 75 we even found slightly
higher mortality rates in the HRS between waves 2000 and 2002 than in the population
which gives even more support to our interpretation of the data as “optimism” at higher
ages.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Estimation Strategy
We estimate the model separately for men and women but again, for notational con-
venience, we do not display an index for sex. To estimate the four parameters of our
model, Ψ = [φ, ξ, δ, λ], we pool a sample of the HRS data formed of the HRS waves
{2000, 2002, 2004}. In each interview age group j we then have Nj observations de-
noted as i ∈ {1, . . . , Nj} where Nj differs across groups. In our estimation we weigh
observations by the inverse of the group sizes, 1
Nj
, such that we down-weigh age groups
with many observations relative to age groups with few observations and vice versa.13
13Observe that this weighting scheme implies that our point estimates are identical to a regression
based on the average survival rates in each group. Parameter estimates from an un-weighted regression
are similar and are available upon request.
19
Figure 6: Objective survival rates in 2002-2003: HRS data versus population averages
(a) Men
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(b) Women
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Source: Own calculations based on HRS, SSA and HMD data.
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To determine the parameter values we accordingly solve the following non-linear min-
imization problem
min
Ψ
1
2
J∑
j=1
1
Nj
Nj∑
i=1
(νi (m | j)− νˆ (m | j))2 (12)
Here, νi (m | j) denotes individual i’s conditional subjective belief to survive from in-
terview age j to target age m in the HRS data, whereby target ages are assigned to
interview ages according to the pattern in table 1. νˆ (m | j) is the predicted subjective
belief according to our model as described in proposition 2.
We solve the above non-linear programming problem subject to the inequality con-
straints
δ ∈ [0, 1], λ ∈ [0, 1], ξ ∈ [0, 1] and
0 ≤ φ · pi(r + 1 | r) ≤ 1 for all r = 0, ...,m− 1. (13)
using a constrained optimizer. As unique convergence is not guaranteed for such prob-
lems, we tried various combinations of starting values, Ψ0, for all of our scenarios that
follow. For all these combinations the solver returned the same solution vector Ψˆ. We
are therefore confident that the solver converges to the unique global minimum. We
bootstrap standard errors by drawing with replacement from our data on subjective
beliefs and from our predicted data on objective survival probabilities in a total of 500
bootstrap iterations. With one exception, see section 4.3 below, the bound constraints
on the parameters in equation (13) were never binding in all these iterations.
4.2 Main Results
Our main estimation results, based on the sample including all observations with focal
point answers, compare figure 3, are summarized in table 2. The upper part of the
table shows parameter estimates in the case of non-ambiguous beliefs resulting in the
standard model of rational Bayesian learning. The lower part of the table shows the
respective estimates for our preferred specification with ambiguous beliefs where, in
addition to rational Bayesian learning, the learning process may be prone to psycho-
logical bias. For each estimated parameter, the table contains sex specific information
on the point estimates, Ψˆ, the respective standard errors, σˆ(Ψ), and the 95% confi-
dence intervals of the coefficient estimates, ĈI(ψ). In order to document the fraction
of the overall variation of survival probabilities in the data that is explained by the
respective parsimonious model we also report the R2 of the regressions. In addition,
we report an “average R2”, denoted as R¯2, as a measure of the fraction of the variation
in average survival probabilities explained by our model.
From the table entries we already observe that the model featuring only rational
Bayesian learning is rejected because it does not have explanatory power in the case
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Table 2: Parameter estimates
Rational Bayesian learning
Men Women
Ψˆ σˆ(Ψ) ĈI(ψ) Ψˆ σˆ(Ψ) ĈI(ψ)
Initial pessimism: φ 0.990 0.002 [0.987, 0.994] 0.986 0.001 [0.985, 0.988]
Update parameter: ξ 0.067 0.021 [0.039, 0.111] 0.006 0.002 [0.002, 0.011]
R2 -0.013 0.011 [-0.038, 0.006] 0.030 0.006 [0.016, 0.041]
R¯2 -0.393 0.226 [-0.863, 0.023] 0.366 0.098 [0.141, 0.524]
Psychologically biased Bayesian learning
Men Women
Ψˆ σˆ(Ψ) ĈI(ψ) Ψˆ σˆ(Ψ) ĈI(ψ)
Initial pessimism: φ 0.991 0.002 [0.987, 0.995] 0.993 0.001 [0.991, 0.995]
Update parameter: ξ 0.037 0.016 [0.017, 0.081] 0.005 0.005 [-0.005, 0.016]
Degree of ambiguity: δ 0.173 0.033 [0.121, 0.245] 0.321 0.022 [0.280, 0.369]
Degree of optimism: λ 0.481 0.026 [0.433, 0.533] 0.397 0.018 [0.368, 0.430]
R2 0.041 0.004 [0.032, 0.048] 0.066 0.003 [0.060, 0.071]
R¯2 0.784 0.037 [0.677, 0.820] 0.960 0.010 [0.923, 0.962]
Notes: Ψˆ are point estimates of model parameters, σˆ(Ψ) is the respective standard deviation and
ĈI(Ψ) is the respective 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping
the subjective and objective survival probabilities by drawing with replacement in 500 bootstrap
iterations.
Source: Own calculations based on HRS, SSA and HMD data.
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of men (the R2 is negative and insignificant).14 Figure 7 illustrates why the model
with non-ambiguous beliefs is performing so poorly by comparing the subjective data
to the predicted values from the model. First, observe that there is a strong initial
underestimation of life-expectancy which is reflected in the precise estimates of φ < 1
for both men and women. To interpret the (precise) point estimates of this parameter,
i.e., φ = 0.990 for men and φ = 0.986 for women, observe that φ30 captures the initial
underestimation of an agent of interview age 50 to survive until target age 80, cf.
equation (7). In the data we observe an underestimation by −13.70 percentage points
for men (−15.07 percentage points for women) and our point estimates of φ imply
−13.67 percentage points for men and−23.35 for women. While slightly overestimating
the initial pessimism of women, the model therefore broadly captures the initial biases
observed in the data. Second, as already discussed in section 1, we observe only a
relatively low degree of convergence of the subjective data to the objective data at
young ages. Consequently, the point estimates of ξ are generally low and numerically
even close to zero in the case of women. Third, rational Bayesian learning implies
convergence of subjective beliefs to objective probabilities for high ages, cf. observation
1. As the subjective data are above the objective data at higher ages, the rational
Bayesian updating model therefore fails to match the actual patterns of subjective
beliefs.
Quite in contrast, our model of psychologically biased Bayesian learning which
considers ambiguous beliefs results in a decent fit to the average subjective survival
expectations, compare figure 8. For both men and women, predicted subjective beliefs
track the average subjective beliefs from the data nicely. An exception is the fit to
survival expectations at higher ages for men. Here, psychologically biased Bayesian
learning converges faster to λ than for women because convergence of δj to 1 is faster,
cf. figure 9. This faster convergence is caused by the lower objective unconditional
survival probabilities of men to reach interview age j, cf. proposition 2. Consequently,
the R2 of the regressions is significantly higher for women than for men, compare table
2.15 Unsurprisingly, our parsimonious specification of average beliefs results in low R2s
of the regressions - 0.041 for men and 0.066 for women - because the model can only
capture some of the variation in answer patterns. The model however explains 78.4
percent of the average variation of subjective beliefs of men (95.9 percent in the case
of women).
As far as the point estimates are concerned we observe that the changes in the
point estimates of φ, the initial pessimism, are low when we move from the rational
Bayesian learning to the psychologically biased Bayesian learning model. Coming back
14We calculate the R2 as 1−RSS/TSS, where RSS is the residual sum of squares and TSS is the
total sum of squares. It is well-known that R2 calculated as such is not guaranteed to be in the range
of [0, 1] in non-linear regression models, cf. Greene (2008, Ch. 11).
15The value of the two-sided t-test on the difference between the R2s for men and women is 108.77
with a p-value of 0.0. The values of Jarque-Bera test statistics for normality of the distribution of the
bootstrapped R2s (and their p-values) are at 2.18 (0.33) for men and at 4.48 (0.11) for women such
that a standard t-test is applicable.
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Figure 7: Actual and predicted survival probabilities for rational Bayesian learning
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(b) Women
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Notes: Black dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals obtained from 500 bootstrap iterations.
Source: Own calculations based on HRS, HMD and SSA data.
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to our example of the subjective belief of a 50 year old to reach target age 80, the
estimated values of φ now imply an underestimation by −12.80 percentage points for
men (−13.34 precentage points for women) compared to −13.70 percentage points
(−15.07 percentage points) in the data. As part of the rational Bayesian learning
motive at work in our model is now superseded by psychologically biased learning, the
point estimates of ξ for men are significantly lower than before and for women the
estimated parameter value is now insignificant.
We further find that the measure of optimism under ambiguity is significantly higher
for men, i.e., λ = 0.481 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.433, 0.533], than for women,
i.e., λ = 0.397 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.368, 0.430], and that the estimated
ambiguity is initially significantly lower for men, i.e., δ = 0.173 with a 95% confidence
interval of [0.121, 0.245], than for women, i.e., δ = 0.321 with a 95% confidence interval
of [0.280, 0.369]. According to our interpretation of ambiguous beliefs, the weight
(1− δj) measures how much evidence gained from rational Bayesian learning is taken
into account. Conversely, δj corresponds to the weight by which beliefs are affected by
some “myside bias,” in our model formalized as personal attitudes towards optimism,
resp. pessimism, as measured by λ. A literal interpretation of our estimation results
would therefore suggest that, on the one hand, the belief formation of men initially
starts out more rational than that of women in that men put more weight on the
available evidence. However, as already discussed above, δj is found to increase more
strongly for men than for women with increasing age j, cf. figure 9. Thus, on the other
hand, men are apparently more prone to an irrational “myside bias” than women in
the long run whereby men are more optimistically biased than women.
Because of the simplicity of our model - owed to our wish for parsimony - we do
not want to overstretch the significance of such specific interpretations. As a very
robust result of our analysis, however, we find for both genders that the assumption
of a psychological “myside bias” in the interpretation of new information can better
explain the survival belief formation of a representative agent than the assumption of
a learning process which is based on evidence alone.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis – Focal Point Answers
As discussed in section 3, our analysis may be confounded by the presence of focal
point answers. We therefore repeat our estimation using a second data set where
all observations with focal point answers are excluded. Estimation results for this
alternative data set are summarized in table 3. A comparison with our benchmark
results in table 2 shows that the broad pattern of estimated values does not change
much. We here report results from a constrained model with ξ = 0 in the case of
women because the point estimate of ξ was negative for these data and again find that
the (constrained) model performs statistically better for women.16
16The value of the two-sided t-test is 20.24 with a p-value of 0.0. The values of Jarque-Bera test
statistics for normality of the distribution of the bootstrapped R2s (and their p-values) are at 2.15
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Figure 8: Actual and predicted survival probabilities for psychologically biased
Bayesian learning
(a) Men
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(b) Women
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Notes: Black dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals obtained from 500 bootstrap iterations.
Source: Own calculations based on HRS, HMD and SSA data.
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Figure 9: Degree of ambiguity (δj)
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Notes: Black dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals obtained from 500 bootstrap iterations.
Source: Own calculations based on HRS, HMD and SSA data.
Table 3: Parameter estimates (excluding focal point answers)
Psychologically biased Bayesian learning
Men Women
Ψˆ σˆ(Ψ) ĈI(ψ) Ψˆ σˆ(Ψ) ĈI(ψ)
Initial pessimism: φ 0.992 0.003 [0.987, 0.997] 0.995 0.001 [0.993, 0.999]
Update parameter: ξ 0.021 0.082 [0.001, 0.137] 0 – –
Degree of ambiguity: δ 0.208 0.046 [0.127, 0.317] 0.436 0.030 [0.384, 0.503]
Degree of optimism: λ 0.460 0.044 [0.408, 0.536] 0.429 0.014 [0.401, 0.457]
R2 0.045 0.005 [0.033, 0.053] 0.053 0.004 [0.044, 0.060]
R¯2 0.849 0.129 [0.129, 0.848] 0.900 0.029 [0.803, 0.915]
Notes: Ψˆ are point estimates of model parameters, σˆ(Ψ) is the respective standard deviation and
ĈI(Ψ) is the respective 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping
the subjective and objective survival probabilities by drawing with replacement in 500 bootstrap
iterations.
Source: Own calculations based on HRS, SSA and HMD data.
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5 Conclusion
The HRS data on subjective survival beliefs suggest a violation of the rational expec-
tations paradigm as well as of the rational Bayesian learning hypothesis. In a first
step we therefore propose a new model of Bayesian learning that encompasses rational
Bayesian learning while it additionally allows for the existence of a psychological bias
in the interpretation of new information. For this purpose our formal approach com-
bines concepts, such as non-additive beliefs and generalized Bayesian updating, from
the theory of decision making under ambiguity with the standard approach of rational
Bayesian updating. The resulting model of psychologically biased belief formation is
very parsimonious in that it requires a low parametrization reflecting, first, an initially
biased additive estimator of subjective survival probabilities, second, a measure of the
strength of the rational Bayesian updating process, third, a measure for the agent’s am-
biguity with respect to her initial estimator of her subjective survival probability, and,
fourth, a measure for the agent’s optimistic versus pessimistic attitudes with respect
to this ambiguity.
In a second step we estimate the parameters of our theoretical model by pooling the
HRS data. Despite the parsimonious parametrization we find that our model results
in a remarkable fit to the average subjective beliefs expressed in the data. The model’s
performance is statistically better for women than for men. For both genders we can
clearly reject the hypothesis that the HRS data on subjective survival probabilities may
be explained by rational Bayesian learning. The reason is that the rational Bayesian
learning hypothesis implies convergence of the subjective probabilities to the respective
objective data at higher ages but we instead observe an increasing degree of optimism
in the data. On the contrary, our more sophisticated model of psychologically biased
Bayesian learning can match these patterns in the data.
In our model we condition the updating of subjective beliefs only on the age of
individuals by which we obtain a representative agent interpretation. The strength
of this parsimonious approach is that we can directly map our model into life-cycle
models of consumption and savings. In our future research we will use this framework
to discuss the demand for annuities and to evaluate the implications of our model for
life-cycle consumption and savings profiles. Another avenue of research which we plan
to follow is an empirical study in which we condition updating of beliefs on observed
idiosyncratic shocks in between waves of the HRS, similar to Smith, Taylor, Sloan,
Johnson, and Desvouges (2001).
(0.34) for men and at 1.91 (0.38) for women such that a standard t-test is suitable.
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A Appendix
A.1 Generalized Bayesian Update Rule
In the present paper, we consider the so-called generalized (or full) Bayesian update
rule. An axiomatic foundation under the assumption of CEU preferences is provided
in Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2006).
Definition 2. The generalized Bayesian update rule for determining the conditional
capacity νI , I ∈ Σ, for a given prior capacity ν is given as follows: for all E ∈ Σ,
νI (E) =
ν (E ∩ I)
ν (E ∩ I) + 1− ν (E ∪ ¬I) .
Observation 2. Let E, I /∈ {∅, S} and E ∩ I 6= ∅. Then an application of the
generalized Bayesian update rule to a neo-additive prior results in the posterior belief
νI (E) = δI · λ+ (1− δI) · p˜iI (E) (14)
such that
δI =
δ
δ + (1− δ) · p˜i (I) . (15)
Proof. Let E, I /∈ {∅, S} and E ∩ I 6= ∅. Then
νI (E) =
δ · λ+ (1− δ) · p˜i (E ∩ I)
δ · λ+ (1− δ) · p˜i (E ∩ I) + 1− (δ · λ+ (1− δ) · p˜i (E ∪ ¬I))
=
δ · λ+ (1− δ) · p˜i (E ∩ I)
1 + (1− δ) · (p˜i (E ∩ I)− p˜i (E ∪ ¬I))
=
δ · λ+ (1− δ) · p˜i (E ∩ I)
1 + (1− δ) · (p˜i (E ∩ I)− p˜i (E)− p˜i (¬I) + p˜i (E ∩ ¬I))
=
δ · λ+ (1− δ) · p˜i (E ∩ I)
1 + (1− δ) · (−p˜i (¬I))
=
δ · λ+ (1− δ) · p˜i (E ∩ I)
δ + (1− δ) · p˜i (I)
= δI · λ+ (1− δI) · p˜iI (E)
with δI given by (15).
A.2 Estimates of Stochastic Trends in Life Expectancy
Table 4 reports the estimated θ-coefficients of equation (9) of our population model.
Estimated parameter values for wave 1, 2 and 3 are based on population data from
HMD and SSA for 1900− 2000, 1900− 2002 and 1900− 2004, respectively.
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Table 4: Parameter estimates of θˆ
Men Women
θˆ σˆ(θ) θˆ σˆ(θ)
wave 1 -1.4186 0.5336 -1.8586 0.5339
wave 2 -1.4123 0.5426 -1.8287 0.5336
wave 3 -1.4518 0.4927 -1.8462 0.5103
Notes: Standard errors of θˆ are calculated from 500 bootstrap iterations.
Source: Own calculations based on SSA and HMD.
A.3 Estimation Results for Alternative Objective Data
We here investigate sensitivity of our results with respect to alternative objective data
using the SSA data instead of our own projections. As shown in table 5, results do not
differ much compared to our benchmark results in table 2. Standard errors are slightly
lower when we use the SSA data because there we do not account for the uncertainty
underlying the predictions of the objective survival rates.
Table 5: Parameter estimates (using the predictions of the SSA)
Psychologically biased Bayesian learning
Men Women
Ψˆ σˆ(Ψ) ĈI(ψ) Ψˆ σˆ(Ψ) ĈI(ψ)
Initial pessimism: φ 0.993 0.002 [0.989, 0.996] 0.995 0.001 [0.993, 0.997]
Update parameter: ξ 0.057 0.024 [0.031, 0.114] 0.005 0.006 [-0.006, 0.018]
Degree of ambiguity: δ 0.196 0.027 [0.148, 0.249] 0.309 0.020 [0.267, 0.346]
Degree of optimism: λ 0.499 0.021 [0.468, 0.546] 0.414 0.014 [0.395, 0.446]
R2 0.038 0.003 [0.031, 0.045] 0.066 0.003 [0.060, 0.072]
R¯2 0.707 0.043 [0.616, 0.737] 0.962 0.010 [0.926, 0.963]
Notes: Ψˆ are point estimates of model parameters, σˆ(Ψ) is the respective standard deviation and
ĈI(Ψ) is the respective 95% confidence interval. Standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping
the subjective and objective survival probabilities by drawing with replacement in 500 bootstrap
iterations.
Source: Own calculations based on HRS, SSA and HMD data.
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B Separate Appendix
We here describe in detail the steps taken to derive the equations in proposition
2 from proposition 1 using the assumptions made in subsection 2.3. First, under
the assumptions that (i) h ⊆ Ih, (ii) µn(h) (m) = pi (m) and µn(h) (j) = pi (j), (iii)
p˜i (m | j) = φm−jpi (m | j) and (iv) j = h, we can rewrite p˜iIh(m | j) in proposition 1 as
p˜iIh (m | j) = γ∗n(h) · p˜i (m | j) +
(
1− γ∗n(h)
) · µn(h) (m)
µn(h) (j)
⇔
p˜ij (m | j) =
(
γ∗j · φm−j +
(
1− γ∗j
)) · pi (m | j) (16)
Second, using the additional assumptions that (i) n(h) = n(j) = ψj and (ii)
p˜i(j)φjpi(j) we can rewrite γ?j as
γ∗j =
p˜i (j) · (α+ β)
p˜i (j) · (α + β) + n (h) · pi(j)
=
φjpi (j) · (α + β)
pi (j) (φj · (α + β) + ψj)
=
φj
φj + ψ
α+β
j
=
φj
φj + ξj
Using the above in (16) we finally get
p˜ij (m | j) =
(
γ∗j · φm−j +
(
1− γ∗j
)) · pi (m | j)
=
(
φj
φj + ξj
· φm−j +
(
1− φ
j
φj + ξj
))
· pi (m | j)
=
φm + ξj
φj + ξj
· pi (m | j) .
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